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IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS
AND ALIEN CITIZENS
Leti Volpp*
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF

By Mae Ngai. Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 2004. Pp. 377. $35.

MODERN AMERICA.

INTRODUCTION

America is a nation of immigrants, according to our national
narrative. This is the America with its gates open to the world, as well
as the America of the melting pot.1
Underpinning this national narrative is a very particular story of
immigration that foregrounds the inclusion of immigrants, rather than
their exclusion. Highlighted in this story is the period before 1924, of
relatively unfettered European immigration, and the period after
1965, post the lifting of national origins quotas. Also underlying this
national narrative is a particular story about what happens once
immigrants enter. In this story the immigrant traverses smoothly from
settlement to assimilation and then citizenship. This social experience
is accompanied by a teleology of legal categorization, whereby the
immigrant is first lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, and then
naturalizes to become a citizen.2
In a stunning and beautifully written book, historian Mae Ngai3
directs our attention to a history occluded in our national narrative of

* Professor of Law, American University Law School. Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA
School of Law. - Ed. Many thanks to Muneer Ahmad and David Eng for their extremely
helpful comments.

1. For an example of a description of America as a "nation of immigrants," that also
describes "gates [open] to the world" and the "melting pot," see AM. PARK NETWORK,
STATUE OF LIBERTY NATIONAL MONUMENT HISTORY (2001), at http://www.americanpark
network.com/parkinfo/sl/history/nation.html.
2. For the argument that this national narrative is waning, see Hiroshi Motomura,
Americans-in-Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States
(2005) (draft manuscript, on file with the author). Motomura asserts that the lifting of
national origins quotas in 1965, which broadened who could be admitted as a legal
permanent resident, has resulted in permanent residence coming to mean less. The
permanent resident is no longer considered an "American-in-waiting." Motomura's
argument is that we should restore permanent residence to this historical status. Id.
3.

Associate Professor of History, University of Chicago.
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immigration and citizenship. Impossible Subjects examines the
woefully understudied period between 1924 and 1965, the tenure of
the national origins quota system. This era began with the passage of
the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act in 1924 and ended with the lifting
of national origins quotas with the passage of the Hart-Celler Act of
1965. This epoch, the most comprehensive immigration restriction in
U.S. history, literally "remapped the nation" (p. 3). The period of 1924
through 1965 remapped the nation by developing both a particular
racial and ethnic identity and a "new sense of territoriality" (p. 3).
Broad-based immigration exclusion created a heightened sense of
national borders as well as the state surveillance of those borders,
which helped produce what we now know as the "illegal alien."
Ngai's book does not only focus on an understudied historical
period of immigration regulation; it also centers immigrants who are
marginalized in immigration scholarship. The subject of her book is
not the legal permanent resident enjoying an untroubled route to
American citizenship. Instead, Impossible Subjects primarily
concentrates on immigrants variously categorized as illegal aliens,
alien citizens, colonial subj ects, and contract laborers.4
These are immigrants whose experiences we do not center in our
national narrative. As a result, the juridical regulation that governed
them has been so hidden in both national and community memory
that we suffer a collective amnesia. Ngai turns our attention to laws
and policies, such as those governing the Chinese Confession Program
of the 1950s, Japanese American citizenship renunciation in the 1940s,
and Filipino voluntary repatriation in the 1930s, that have largely or
completely escaped the purview of legal scholarship.5 Impossible
Subjects features meticulous research that fills important gaps in our
knowledge of the history of immigration law. But the book does not
merely show us a new archive; Ngai turns her research to important
analytical use.
Throughout the book, Ngai reminds us that what we experience
today as common sense in terms of our immigration law and policy is
historically contingent. She describes policies which in the
4. A note on terminology: For stylistic reasons, I use the term "immigrant" in this
Review to refer not only to the technically correct sense of the legal permanent resident, but
also to refer to categories of noncitizens that under the Immigration and Nationality Act
would be referred to instead as nonimmigrants, aliens, or nationals. I also, following Ngai,
use the term "illegal alien." As in her book, I use the term not for the purpose of
reproducing racist stereotypes, but to locate the historical origins and consequences of the
terni.
5. Discussion of the Chinese Confession Program is entirely absent in the Jaw reviews.
For the only substantive discussion of Japanese American citizenship renunciation in the Jaw
reviews, see Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community Among
"We the People," 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 242-47 (1997). The repatriation of Filipinos is
mentioned only in passing. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and
Antimiscegenation Laws in California, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795, 823 & n.112 (2000).
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contemporary moment seem unthinkable, either in their progressivity
(for example, statutes of limitation on the federal power to deport,
which prohibited deportation after the immigrant had resided for one
year in the United States) or in their regressivity (for example, the
policy of "pre-examination," which restricted this form of legalization
to European immigrants).6 The two examples of these policies, both of
which magically turned illegal immigrants into lawful ones, also
demonstrate a central theme of the book. What we believe to be
hardened borders of citizenship and immigrant status have in actuality
been enormously malleable. Both citizens and aliens have been
"made" and "unmade," through both acts of the state and of the
individual. And the border between the "legal" and the "illegal" has
been porous. At the heart of the book are the questions of illegality in
immigration and how illegal immigration came to be cast as the central
problem of U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth century.
Today the conflation of the racial identity "Mexican" with the term
"illegal alien" is indisputable. The two terms completely subsume one
another in a way that aligns with our everyday understanding of
immigration control - even while this does not track empirical fact.7
Impossible Subjects shows us how this conflation was historically
created. Ngai demonstrates precisely how the "illegal alien" was
produced as a new legal and political subject and how it became
synonymous with the racial identity "Mexican."
Presumptive illegality has not only shaped the experiences of those
branded as "illegal aliens." Ngai traces how the presence of large
illegal populations in certain communities has contributed to the
construction of Asian and Latino communities in general as
illegitimate, criminal, and unassimilable. These communities are
peopled by what Ngai calls "alien citizens" (p. 2), persons who enjoy
the formal status of citizenship as an immigration matter, but lack
citizenship as a matter of identity. An important section of Impossible
Subjects is devoted to the notion of alien citizenship.

6. See discussion, infra

pp. 108-09.

7. The Department of Homeland Security's statistics report that one-third of all
undocumented persons in the United States are not in unlawful status because they crossed
the border without lawful admission, but because they were originally lawfully admitted
(from all over the world), but then overstayed their visa. See Homeland Security: Overstay
Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec. , and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2003) [hereinafter Homeland Security Overstay] (statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury,
Managing
Director,
Research
and
Methods),
at
Applied

http://www .gao.gov/new.items/d04170t.pdf. In this testimony before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Nancy Kingsbury of the General Accounting Office asserts that the one
third figure probably underestimates the extent of overstaying. Id. at 6.
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Impossible Subjects is incredibly rich in its archival detail, powerful
in its argument, and broad in its scope. I will first focus on Ngai's
analysis of the historical construction of the illegal alien through what
may seem, at first blush, paradoxical: the regulation of legal
immigration, first, in the form of national origins quotas from the
Eastern Hemisphere, second, in the form of the bracero program
made up of workers from Mexico, and, third, through the retention of
numerical per-country quotas in 1 965. I will discuss this history in light
of President George W. Bush's proposal to create a new guest-worker
program, as well as Samuel Huntington's controversial new book,
Who Are We,8 which calls for curbing immigration from Mexico in
light of its threat to "American national identity."
I will then turn to Ngai's discussion of "alien citizens." Ngai
analyzes a relationship between migrancy, nationalism, and war that is
made visible in the renunciation by 5 ,500 Japanese Americans in
internment camps of their U.S. citizenship during World War II, as
well as the legalization of 30,000 Chinese Americans who "confessed"
their illegal immigration status during the Cold War period. I will
consider these questions in light of the present "war on terror."
I.

ILLEGAL ALIENS

Ngai begins Impossible Subjects by explaining how the Johnson
Reed Immigration Act of 1924 was simultaneously the end of one era
and the beginning of another. The Act ended unlimited immigration
from Europe and for the first time imposed numerical limits on
immigration through a quota system that ranked the world's
population in terms of nationality and race.
Many scholars have made reference to the fact that the Act aimed
to curtail immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, which
soared after World War I.9 The Act accomplished this through basing
the quotas, first, on figures from 1890, and later, on the census of 1920.
Ngai explains, in compelling and disturbing detail, why there was such
a shift. The temporary quota of two percent of the foreign born
population in 1890, as explicitly discriminatory, was recognized by the
nativists who led the drive for restriction to be potentially
controversial.10 Shifting to a quota based on the 1920 census allowed

8. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004).
9. See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Races at the Gate: A Century of Racial Distinctions in American
Immigration Policy (1865-1965), 1 5 GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 625, 636-37 (2001).
10. On the debate as to whether to use the benchmark of the 1890 Census,

see also

DESMOND KING, MARKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 203-04 (2000); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A
DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 83-84 (1998).
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similar numerical results, inflating the number of Northern European
slots, now with the appearance of nondiscrimination (p. 22).
Apportioning slots on the basis of the 1920 census could reach the
same results, even after mass immigration from Southern and Eastern
Europe, through switching the statistical pool. The 1920 figures
apportioned slots not solely based upon the foreign-born population,
but upon the entire population of the United States, immigrant and
otherwise, thus maintaining the statistical advantage of Northern
Europeans. Doing otherwise would, in the words of the immigration
restrictionist whose concept grounded the 1924 Act, discriminate
against "those who have arrived at an earlier date and thereby
contributed more to the advancement of the nation" (p. 22). Basing
quotas on these 1920 figures enabled Great Britain and Northern
Ireland in 1929 to receive an annual quota of 65,721 persons a year, in
contrast to 2,784 for Russia, and 5,802 for Italy (pp. 28-29 table 1 . 1).
But the 1924 Act did not actually consider the entire population of
the United States. Rather, whites were the only population counted
for purposes of developing national quotas. The law stipulated that
"'inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920' does not include
(1) immigrants from the [Western Hemisphere] or their descendants,
(2) aliens ineligible for citizenship or their descendants, (3) the
descendants of slave immigrants, or (4) the descendants of the
American aborigines" (p. 26). Thus, the "colored races" were erased
from the history of national origins of America (p. 27).1 1
This is how the United States largely closed its doors to the
undesirable races of Southern and Eastern Europe, while
simultaneously drawing a color line around Europe, not through it (p.
17). Thus while erecting a hierarchy of difference within Europe, the
Johnson-Reed Immigration Act also asserted an American race
entirely made up of European descendants.
Formally, the quota system encompassed all countries in the world,
except for the Western Hemisphere, which was exempted due to
American diplomatic and trade interests with Canada and Mexico and
the need for agricultural labor from Mexico (p. 50). All countries in
the Eastern Hemisphere received the minimum quota of one hundred
persons. At the same time, the 1924 Act excluded from immigration
those deemed to be "aliens ineligible for citizenship."12 Even though
11. See also

Roger Daniels,

& OTIS
(noting these

Two Cheers for Immigration, in ROGER DANIELS

GRAHAM, DEBATING AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: 1882-PRESENT 22 (2001)
omissions in the 1924 Act in defining American national identity).

12. The first federal citizenship statute, passed by Congress in 1790, limited
naturalization to "free white" aliens. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. This was
amended to permit naturalization of " aliens of African nativity" or "African descent" in
1870. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, sec. 7, 16 Stat. 254. From 1870 until 1952, when the racial
bar on naturalization was entirely lifted, there was considerable litigation. Most persons
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China, for example, received a quota of one hundred, the only persons
eligible to emigrate from China were non-Chinese persons (p. 27). We
can see here the mechanisms that shaped U.S. demographics so that
pundits like Peter Brimelow, author of the best-selling book, Alien
Nation, allege that the "ethnic core" of the United States - to which
he argues that we must return - has been white.13 It bears mention
that if the United States had enjoyed immigration unfettered by racial
exclusion, presuming that immigrants entered in proportion to their
world populations, we would experience a very different national
identity, given that over one-half of the world's population is Asian.
What Ngai also carefully shows is something that seems quite
paradoxical: how these numerical restrictions, which did not apply to
the Western Hemisphere, nonetheless created illegal immigration
from Mexico. She argues that numerical restriction created a new class
of persons in the national body, in the form of illegal aliens (p. 57).
Before the 1920s, few immigrants were deported.14 Deportation
functioned as a corrective to exclusion; in other words, if a person
should not have lawfully entered, and was caught in an asylum or
hospital or prison, they might be deported.15 Thus, in 1891, Congress
authorized the deportation of aliens who within one year of arrival
became public charges from causes existing prior to landing, in other
words, causes that would have kept them from entry in the first place.
Deportation did not have its own substantive grounds. And note that
the federal government did not have an unlimited time within which to
act. It was, in fact, considered unconscionable to deport an immigrant
denied naturalization as racially ineligible were Asian. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).

13. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 10 (1995). For critical reviews of Alien Nation, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 111 (1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927 (1996); Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105
YALE L.J. 1963 (1996).
14. I am referring here to deportation by the federal government. For discussions of the
history of expulsion by state and local authorities of individuals for reasons of crime,
poverty, and disease, see generally Kunal Parker, Making Blacks Foreigners: The Legal
Construction of Former Slaves in Post-Revolutionary Massachusetts, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 75,
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-I875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).

and Gerald

15. P. 59. Historically, a noncitizen denied admission at a port of entry was said to be
"excluded"; those expelled from the interior, whether lawfully present or not, were
"deported." Entry into the United States is no longer the dividing line. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 replaced both exclusion and
deportation with the word "removal," made the dividing line as to whether one was subject
to grounds of deportability or excludability the question not of entry but of lawful admission,
and thus specified that persons present in the interior without lawful admission were to be
treated like those denied admission at a port of entry. For a discussion of this shift, see
STEPHEN H. LEG OMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 3, 380-81 (3d ed.
2002).
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after he had settled and begun to assimilate. The Immigration Act of
1917 extended the statute of limitation on deportation from one year
to five years from arrival (p. 59).
The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 both eliminated the
statute of limitation on deportation and created separate grounds for
deportation (p. 60). Significantly, the Immigration Service was now
authorized to deport at any time any person who entered without a
valid visa or without valid inspection (p. 60). The 1924 Act also
established, for the first time, a land border patrol. In addition,
unauthorized entry became a criminal, as well as a deportable, offense
(p. 60). Thus, the new numerical restrictions on legal immigration
required a concomitant enforcement apparatus, which led to new
surveillance and new ways of thinking about immigration and unlawful
entry. This enforcement apparatus coincided with the creation of the
illegal alien; they were mutually produced.
By the late 1920s, deportation was becoming an expensive
proposition. To make expulsion more efficient, the Immigration
Service allowed illegal aliens without criminal records to depart
voluntarily (p. 60). Aliens without a proper visa became the largest
single class of deportees and accounted for over half of formal
deportations and the overwhelming majority of such voluntary
departures by the late 1 920s (p. 60).
And here we see the seeds of the fusion of the illegal alien with the
criminal alien, which continues to this day. Entry without a visa meant,
in the words of the Immigration Service, that the "first act upon
reaching our shores [is] to break our laws by entering in a clandestine
manner" (p. 61 ). The illegal alien was presumed to have general
criminal tendencies, because he had broken the law through illegally
entering. In the words of one INS official, "[b]ecause the 'wetback'
starts out by violating a law, . . . it is easier and sometimes appears
even more necessary for him to break other laws since he considers
himself to be an outcast, even an outlaw" (p. 149). This equating of
"illegal" in the immigration sense with "criminal" coincided with the
racialization of the illegal alien as Mexican and with the concomitant
construction of all Mexicans as both illegal and criminal. Thus, we can
see how processes of territorial and administrative enforcement that
were not, in the first instance, motivated by or defined by race
produced presumptions about race (p. 63).
The perception of the "illegal alien" as Mexican was born at a time
when there were no numerical limits on immigration from Mexico.
Until 1919, Mexicans were allowed to enter freely; after that time they
were required to apply for admission at ports of entry and subjected to
entry requirements such as a head tax and visa fee (p. 64). Those who
sought to avoid the requirements, or feared denial of admission,
entered without inspection and became illegal immigrants. The
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enforcement of immigration restrictions - through. inspection
procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, and criminal prosecution
- created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants (p. 71).
The Border Patrol was originally formed to deter Chinese, who
were generally barred from entry,16 and Europeans of excludable
classes who sought entry through Canada (p. 64). But the Border
Patrol gained its identity along the U.S.-Mexico border, assuming the
character of criminal pursuit, although charged with civil law
enforcement. In Ngai's words, the Border Patrol "raised the border"
(p. 68). Through their acts, the border was rearticulated as a cultural
and racial boundary and as a creator of illegal immigration.
Ngai shows how Europeans were unmade as illegal, even while
walking or wading across the U.S.-Mexico border became the
quintessential act of illegal immigration. Increasing enforcement
against Europeans created a groundswell for some immigration
reform after European immigrants began to experience the legal
machinery of very limited or nonexistent due process or judicial
review that was developed for Chinese immigrants.17 In 1933 and 1934,
legislation was introduced to grant waivers to deportation in cases
where immigrants were considered deserving (p. 81). As Ngai points
out, the prototypical story told by reformers to exemplify the need for
such reform involved the "poor man's theft" of bread or a sack of coal,
where the immigrant committed the original crime for a family who
now would suffer because of his looming deportation (p. 80). Not
surprisingly, those considered deserving were primarily Europeans
with criminal records (p. 82). Mexicans apprehended without proper
documents were not (p. 82). And the administrative policies allowing
illegal immigrants to evade deportation were either exclusively
restricted to Europeans or implemented for their primary benefit.18
Europeans caught illegally in the United States could follow a
procedure known as pre-examination. The program allowed
Europeans to take voluntary departure to Canada, obtain a visa for
permanent residence from the U.S. consul there, and then reenter as
legal immigrants. Asians did not qualify for the program, as they were
categorically excluded from immigration on grounds of racial
16. Excepted from Chinese exclusion were merchants, students, teachers, tourists, treaty
traders, and diplomats. Ngai, p. 204. For a discussion of Chinese immigration during the
period of exclusion, see ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION
DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA: 1882-1943, at 45 (2003).
17. As Ngai mentions, Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 693 (1893), was prescient. He noted that while today the absolute power of the state to
expel unwanted aliens was "directed only against the obnoxious Chinese; but if the power
exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-morrow against other classes and other
people?" P. 76 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743).
18. See discussion, infra pp. 108-09. Ngai writes: "Legislative and administrative reforms
operated in a way that fueled racial disparity in deportation practices." P. 82.
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ineligibility; while one district director tried to grant pre-examination
to Mexicans, he was stopped after 1938 (pp. 86-87). Between 1935 and
1959, the INS processed nearly 58,000 cases and granted approval in
the vast majority of them (p. 87). Thus, Europeans could convert their
status from illegal aliens to lawful immigrants through pre
examination. In addition, unlawful immigrants could become lawful
through suspension of deportation. Suspension of deportation was
discretionary relief which could be granted to aliens of "good moral
character" if deportation would result in "serious economic
detriment" to the alien's immediate family. The INS suspended the
deportations of several thousand aliens a year from 1941 to the late
1950s (p. 88). While there was no bar to suspending the deportation of
Mexicans, Ngai notes an internal Justice Department study that
indicated that European immigrants constituted the majority of those
whose deportation was suspended.19 Lastly, the Registry Act, which
legalized the status of "honest law-abiding alien[s] who may be in the
country under some merely technical irregularity" upon the payment
of a twenty dollar fee if they could show continuous residence since
1921 and "good moral character," primarily benefited Europeans and
Canadians.20 Ngai estimates that between 1925 and 1965 some 200,000
illegal European immigrants successfully legalized their status through
these three mechanisms (p. 89).
This selective forgiving of the illegal status of European
immigrants is hidden in our history. Its absence from the history books
coincides with the presumption of legal European and illegal Mexican
that is absolutely foundational to our national identity. The illegal
immigrant, presumptively Mexican, functions as the opposite to the
European immigrant, presumed to be legal and on the path towards
citizenship. Europeans have, through the processes Ngai describes,
become entirely legitimated as the center of American citizenship,
while Mexicans have been cast over the borders, as having no rightful
claim of belonging.21
Mexican Americans were literally cast over the borders in the form
of "repatriation" programs of the Great Depression, whereby
authorities removed over 400,000 Mexicans from the Southwest and

19. Seventy-three percent of 389 randomly selected suspension cases in a study
conducted by the Justice Department in 1943 involved Europeans; eight percent involved
Mexicans. P. 88. This is an admittedly small sample.
20. The Registry Act "did not formally favor Europeans over Mexicans," p. 82, but of
the 115,000 immigrants who registered between 1930 and 1940, 80 percent were European or
Canadian. P. 82. Many Mexicans qualified but "few knew about it, understood it, or could
afford the fee." P. 82.
21. Arguably, Mexicans are considered to "belong" in the United States, but as cheap
and flexible labor rather than as citizens.
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Midwest in the early 1930s. An estimated sixty percent of the
"repatriates" were children or American citizens by birth (p. 72). The
repatriations were a mix of voluntary departures, deportations by the
INS, and organized removals by local welfare bureaus seeking to expel
unwanted Mexicans from their jurisdictions (p. 73). The identity of
Mexicans in the United States has been so fused with foreignness,
illegality, and nonbelonging that U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry
could be evicted in a racial expulsion program, exceeded in scale only
by the American Indian removals of the nineteenth century (p. 75),
under the rubric of "repatriation" - as if Mexican Americans were
Mexican nationals.22
The nineteenth-century conquest of Mexico's Northern Territories
by the United States, leading to the assertion "[W]e didn't cross the
border, the border crossed us,"23 highlights the strangeness of the
presumptive illegality of Mexicans in the United States. As Ngai
explains, the casting of Mexicans as foreign was accomplished not only
by the immigration enforcement described above, but also by the
context of the political economy of the U.S. Southwest. Conquest of a
population considered subordinate and inassimilable, and desirable
primarily as imported and cheap labor, led to Mexicans being
racialized as foreign in a land now considered to belong to white
Americans.
The Southwest was dominated by agricultural growers who desired
large numbers of Mexican laborers, considered more malleable and
vulnerable than the settled resident workforce. Even though most
Anglos to the region were migrants, Mexicans, whether born in the
United States or not, were considered foreign (p. 132). Foreignness
stripped Mexicans of the claim of belonging as natives; instead, they
were cast as illegitimate and inferior. Mexicans were racialized as
disposable, as a one-dimensional "commodity function" (p. 132).
Growers argued that they were suffering from a severe labor
shortage as of the late 1930s and lobbied for the importation of
Mexican nationals as contract laborers.24 Their success represented a
22. For further discussion of the "repatriations" and of Mexican American and Mexican
immigrant identity, see generally D A VID G. GUTIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLmcs OF ETHNICITY (1995); for further
discussion of the "repatriation" program and of contemporary efforts to seek redress, see
Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: .New Frontiers for Group
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 659-70 (2004).
23. See Interview by Nie Paget-Clarke with Roberto Martinez, Director of the U.S. I
Mexico Border Program in San Diego, Cal. (1997), in Immigration and Human Rights on the
U.S.!Mexico
at
Border
(pt.
4),
IN
MOTION
MAG.,
Sept.
14,
1997,
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/border4.html. See Kim David Chanbonpin, How the
Border Crossed Us: Filling the Gap Between Plume v. Seward and the Dispossession of
Mexican Landowners in California A fter 1848, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 297 (2005).
24. Contract labor stands "outside the free labor market." KITTY CALAvrrA, INSIDE
l.N.S. 21 ( 1992). The

THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE
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sharp break with past policy and practice, which had prohibited
foreign contract labor. As Ngai indicates, since the Civil War, contract
labor was likened to slavery and portrayed as the antithesis of the free
labor on which democracy depended (p. 137). Like the enslaved
person, the contract laborer was not free to bargain over wages and
working conditions, and he had no ability to either choose his
employment or to quit (p. 137-38). In 1885, Congress had passed the
Foran Act, prohibiting the immigration of aliens into the United
States under labor contracts made before their arrival.25
Contract labor was considered so antithetical to the founding
principles of American democracy that the practice was stopped in
Hawai'i after its acquisition by the United States as a territory, and
was never instituted in the Philippines or Puerto Rico under American
colonial rule (p. 138). Yet within the mainland, the United States
turned to a labor practice rejected in its own colonies in the form of
the bracero program. The program required Congress to repeal the
Foran Act.26
Between 1942 and 1964, some 4.6 million Mexicans entered the
United States and worked in twenty-six states. Lobbyists for the
bracero program claimed it would provide farm laborers desperately
needed for the war effort, with the side benefit of eliminating illegal
immigration, all the while protecting foreign nationals from abuse (p.
139). But the Mexican laborers who came in under the bracero
program were largely unsuccessful in keeping wages or working or
housing conditions at the contracted level (pp. 143-46). This is not
surprising given that these workers had limited legal standing in the
society in which they worked. Upwards of several thousand formal
complaints were filed per year. Some voted with their feet. Desertion
from the bracero program occurred at the rate of ten percent per year;
by leaving the program, legal workers were transformed into illegal
aliens. The program generated illegal immigration in another,
contract laborer is not a waged employee. For a definition of the term "contract labor," see
Leah F. Yosko, Legitimizing the Triangular Employment Relationship: Emerging
International Labour Standards from a Comparative Perspective, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 43, 70 n.99 (1997). Yosko defines the term as "work performed for a natural or legal
person . . . under actual conditions of dependency on or subordination to [that person)." Id.
(quoting International Labour Office, Eighty-Fifth Session of the International Labour
Conference Provisional Record, Sixth Item on the Agenda: Contract Labour, para. 191.1
(1997)).
25. Precursors to this Act were the 1862 Act to Prohibit the Coolie Trade by American
Citizens in Americ'an Vessels and the 1875 Page Act that targeted "coolies" as well. For a
discussion of the 1862 Act, see Moon-Ho Jung, Outlawing 'Coolies': Race, Nation, and
Empire in the Age of Emancipation 57 AMERICAN QUARTERLY (forthcoming 2005).
26. P. 139. Smaller programs involved Puerto Ricans who, as "statutory citizens" would
not be considered foreign labor, at least in theory, and workers from the British West Indies.
P. 138.
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unexpected way. Mexico had insisted on the exclusion of states that
explicitly racially discriminated against Mexicans from the bracero
program, namely Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri. Because growers in
these states sought labor from Mexico as well, creating a powerful
pull, recruitment of undocumented labor into these states soared (pp.
147-48). These undocumented workers were labeled "wetbacks."27
The simultaneous existence of bracero and illegal labor seemed to
call for cracking down. Illegal immigration seemed more illegal when
there was a legal method of procuring farm labor. As a result, the INS
stepped up enforcement in the early 1950s with the infamous
Operation Wetback that cleared hundreds of thousands of "wetbacks"
from the United States by dumping them over the border. But Ngai's
statistics make clear that this massive deportation did not forestall
illegal immigration - at best it was a "short-term success" (p. 156).
For the duration of the bracero program, both bracero and illegal
labor continued to coexist, and the existence of the bracero program
seems to have generated illegal immigration, both through defections
from the program and through recruitment by growers of
undocumented labor.
Illegal immigration has not ended, as we know. Ngai argues that
illegal immigration has persisted due to the continued and extended
reach of numerical restriction on legal immigration. Again, this is a
claim that on first blush may seem counterfactual, but Ngai's analysis
is entirely persuasive. The 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act, lauded
as overturning racial discrimination, did not repeal the idea of quotas
in immigration. Rather, immigration reform was narrowed to the
question of formal equality, in terms of apportioning the same number
of slots for each country. On some level, formal equality - given the
history of explicit racial preferences - is understandably appealing.
Ngai suggests that formal equality was desirable as well in terms of the
American image abroad during the Cold War era; formal equality
between countries sent a very visible signal that the United States did
not discriminate between sending states nor among the national
origins of its population. But, as she asserts, substantive equality which would have suggested different-sized quotas for countries with
different needs or sizes, or with specific historical relations with the

27. The term "wetback" referred to Mexicans who had illegally crossed the Rio Grande
into the United States. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. M IA MI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 283 n.92
(1996-97).
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United States - was not mandated by Cold War civil rights28 and was
not a subject of reform.29
Remember that the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, had
been subject to no national origin quotas under the 1924 Immigration
Act.30 A quota of 120,000 for the entire Western Hemisphere went
into effect in 1968. In 1976, an annual country quota of 20,000 on
Mexico was implemented. We can track the relation between this
numerical restriction of legal immigration from Mexico and illegal
immigration. In the early 1960s, the annual legal migration of
Mexicans to the United States approximated 200,000 braceros and
35,000 admissions for permanent residence. The number of
deportations of undocumented Mexicans increased by forty percent in
1968 (the year the 120,000 quota for the Western Hemisphere was
implemented) to 151,000. In 1976 (the year the 20,000 country quota
for Mexico was implemented), the INS expelled 781,000 Mexicans
from the United States. Meanwhile, the total number of
apprehensions for all other nationals in the world, combined,
remained below 100,000 a year (p. 261).
Thus, Ngai shows how illegal immigration from Mexico was
produced. The uniformity of our national origins quota system,
providing the same per-country quota regardless of nonuniform
national populations, needs, and histories, is responsible for the
existence of "illegal aliens," along with administrative enforcement
produced through national immigration restriction and policies that
selectively turned illegal immigrants into lawful ones. Ngai thus issues
a sharp critique to the conventional understanding of the lifting of
national origins quotas. The end to the national origins quotas is
generally lauded as a civil rights victory,31 as the closure to an ugly
history of race-based immigration exclusion.32 But Ngai challenges us
to consider what it has meant to lift national origins quotas while

28. P. 245. Ngai refers here to MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 1-17 (2000). Dudziak's research demonstrates
that Cold War liberals believed that granting African Americans formal equality was
important to America's image abroad, but that substantive equality was not required. P. 245.
29. On formal versus substantive equality in the context of civil rights, see Kimberle
Crenshaw et al., Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
INFORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
30. See supra p. 105. Of course, administrative means - for example, barring Mexicans
from entry when they were considered likely to become a public charge - were used during
that period to cut down on the number of lawful entries.
31. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996).
32. See Schuck, supra note 13, at 1966 (stating that "racism as such no longer plays a
crucial role in immigration law; certainly it plays a less significant role than it did before
1965").
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simultaneously maintaining numerical restrictions. Given the history
of conquest of Mexico by the United States, the contiguous border
between Mexico and the United States, and the disparate economic
conditions between the two countries, it is no wonder that more
Mexicans seek to enter than are lawfully admitted. A true civil rights
victory might have recognized that substantive equality, in the form of
a larger per-country quota, would have been necessary to permit more
legal immigration from Mexico.33
Ngai's historical analysis proves helpful to recent discussions about
implementing a guest-worker program. In January 2004, President
George W. Bush unveiled an immigration reform proposal under the
title "Fair and Secure Immigration Reform." In his announcement he
stated, "[a)s a Texan, I have known many immigrant families, mainly
from Mexico, and I have seen what they add to our country."34 He
described lives risked in "dangerous desert border crossings" and lives
entrusted to "the brutal rings of heartless human smugglers."35 This,
he said is "wrong" and "not the American way."36 Explicitly wrapping
the proposal in the language of family values, he referred to families
being separated by immigration law and stated that "family values do
not end at the Rio Grande border."37 Common sense and fairness,
he asserted, demand that we allow workers to fill jobs Americans are
not filling.
The proposal consisted of a temporary-worker program that would
match "willing foreign workers" with "willing U.S. employers" when
"no Americans can be found to fill the jobs."38 As proposed by Bush,
jobs would be open to both workers overseas and undocumented
individuals within the United States. Workers would receive a three-

33. The impact of uniform per-country quotas has also led to long waits for
potential immigrants from certain countries, especially Mexico, India and the Philippines,
given the larger number of persons seeking family-sponsored immigration visas
countries. See Immigrant Numbers for January 2005, VISA BULL.,
from those
(U.S. Dep't of State, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 8, 2004, at http://travel.state.
gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_2007.html. According to the Bulletin, the current wait for a
U.S. citizen seeking to sponsor a brother or sister from most countries is about twelve years.
Id. For India, the wait is twelve and a half years; for the Philippines, the wait is more than
twenty-two years.
34. Press Release, White House, President Bush Proposes New Temporary
Worker Program: Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.
35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Republicans Squaring Off Over Bush Plan on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A19.

38. See Fact Sheet, White House, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform
(Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0l/print/20040107-1.html
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]; see also Anne Heavey Scheinfeldt, President Bush Proposes New
Temporary Worker Program, 1 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429 (2004).
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year, temporary legal status that was renewable, and that would not
automatically lead to legal permanent residence.39 At the same time,
Bush noted that some workers might "pursue American citizenship,"
which they would need to apply for "in the normal way," and without
gaining "unfair advantage over people who have followed legal
procedures from the start."40
Reaction was swift, and criticism fell across a broad spectrum,41
ranging from the claim that the program launched a "new era of
indentured servants" to condemnation of the program as a "reward"
to "illegal aliens."42 Despite Bush's explicit statements, some saw the
guest-worker program as an amnesty program that could benefit as
many as eight million illegal immigrants.43 Some critics expressed
concern that "illegal aliens" were going "unpunished";44 others decried
the likelihood that this "temporary" program could become
"permanent."45 One way the program was thought to be non
temporary was through the possibility of children of the temporary
workers enjoying birthright citizenship.46 In one gruesome response, a
columnist and talk show host called for sterilization of temporary
workers to ensure the program remained temporary.47
Critics who feared the program would not accrue to the benefit of
vulnerable immigrants pointed out that this was a classic guest-worker
program that instead of giving workers "hope," merely gave workers a
39.

See Fact

40.

See

Sheet, supra note 38.

Scheinfeldt, supra note 38, at 429-30.

41. For the rare laudatory view, see Regina Germain, Perspectives on the Bush
Administration's Immigrant Guestworker Proposal: The Time For Immigration Reform ls
Now, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 747 (2004).
42. See Patricia Medige, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant
Guestworker Proposal: Immigrant Labor Issues, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 735, 737
(2004).
43. See Joseph Curl, Bush's "Guest-Worker"
Sept. 1, 2004, at AlO.

Proposal on a Back Burner, WASH. TIMES,

44. In the words of one commentator, "millions of illegal aliens who are using fake or
stolen Social Security numbers would face no penalty and could remain in the country for an
unspecified number of years." Id.

45. Editorial, Flaws in Bush's Immigration

Plan,

S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2004, at BS.

46.

See Bush "Guest Worker" Program to Be " Open to Any Type of Employee,"
LONEWACKO, Jan. 28, 2004, at http://www.tolstoy.com/lonewacko/blog/archives/000943.html

(describing the statement of Margaret Spellings at a Cato Institute panel that children of
"guest workers" would automatically become citizens if born in the United States).
47. Jane Chastain, a columnist and talk show host stated:
[T)he only way to assure the American people that this "temporary" status truly is
temporary is to seal up the wombs - sterilize - those who apply for guest-worker status.
Or else change the law that grants citizenship to anyone who is born here regardless of the
status of his or her parents.
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=l3565.
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job,48 at the end of which they faced removal. Others called the
program an "immigration trap."49 For undocumented workers within
the United States, identifying oneself to the Department of Homeland
Security in order to secure a temporary-worker visa would mean
providing sufficient information to facilitate deportation if that worker
remained beyond the end of the program and did not qualify to stay
under another immigration category.50 The program, open not just to
agricultural employers but to any employer seeking low-wage overseas
labor, was decried as importing into the United States "Wal-Mart
bracero[s],"51 and raised concerns about the effect of a massive influx
of temporary workers on the wages and working conditions of
American workers.52
Others evaluated the program based upon their assessment of its
relationship to the problem of illegal immigration. Some asserted that
the first order of business was to secure the borders, and then to
develop a guest-worker plan.53 Others claimed that a guest-worker
plan would in fact help reduce illegal immigration. The Cato Institute
claimed that a look at history would indicate that the bracero program
and illegal immigration were inversely correlated during the time of
the program's existence.54 But the history noted in Ngai's book
indicates that the bracero program and illegal immigration were not
inversely correlated, but bore a tautological relationship to one
another.55 Illegal immigration only exists in relationship to legal

48. See David Abraham, American Jobs but Not the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2004, at A19 (also pointing out the possible effects on wages and working conditions).
49. See Bill Ong Hing,
2004, at 17.

Legal Status: Amnesty or Deportation Trap ?,

CHI . TRIB., Jan. 9,

50. Id.; see also
Program (Cyrus

Christina B. LaBrie, President Bush Proposes a New Temporary Worker
D. Mehta & Assoc., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2004, at
http://www.cyrusmehta.com1print_news_articles.asp?news_id=937.
51. Medige, supra note 42, at 735.
52. For earlier scholarship on this point, see Enid Trucios-Haynes,

Temporary Workers
and Future immigration Policy Conflicts: Protecting U. S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand
for Global Human Capital, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 967 (2002).

53. In the words of Representative Tom Tancredo: "The president must understand that
without first securing our borders from the mass flow of illegal immigration, any guest
worker plan is totally unworkable." Sergio Bustos, Bush to Seek Guest Worker Law,
TUCSON CITIZEN, Nov. 10, 2004, at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com.
54. The Cato Institute's Daniel Griswold recently asserted that the "response" to rising
illegal immigration from Mexico was to dramatically increase temporary worker visas under
the bracero program; the result was an equally dramatic decline in illegal immigration.
Daniel Griswold, Immigration: Beyond the Barbed Wire (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 7,
2004, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-07-04.html.
55. For the argument that Bush's proposal would likely lead to an increase in
unauthorized workers, see Philip Martin, Does the U.S. Need a New Bracero Program?, 9
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL Y 127 (2003). See also Philip Martin, AgJOBS: New Solution
or New Problem? (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
'
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immigration. In contrast to the vision of illegal immigrants waiting
outside U.S. borders to enter, illegal immigration is produced through
government regulation demarcating who is legal and who is not. The
border between illegal and legal is mutable, depending upon where
the state decides to draw the line between the two categories, and
depending upon who the state allows to shift from one category to
another. Thus, the idea that there are fixed and identifiable
populations of legal and illegal immigrants who will choose to enter or
not enter the United States in response to a particular policy does not
make sense.
The outcry over a temporary-worker program highlights the
contradictions between U.S. capital's need for cheap labor and the
political imperative of the nation-state.56 The desire for cheap labor in
the form of temporary overseas workers stands in opposition to a
liberal democratic state identified as the guarantor of rights.57 Mexican
immigration has been seen as a "uniquely elastic supply of labor"58 in
the structural contradictions that exist between the economic utility of
immigrants as cheap labor and the political and fiscal costs imposed by
nurturing a surplus labor supply.59 The historical bracero program was
an attempt to institutionalize and routinize this flexible labor;60 the
Bush proposal attempts the same.
Some critics would charge that we must acknowledge that we
already have an informal "guest-worker program" made up of
disposable workers in the form of undocumented immigrants. 61 At the
same time, we already have a legally authorized "guest-worker
program" in the form of temporary-worker programs that have gone
largely ignored in the public debate about Bush's proposal.62 These are
56. See LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 1 5
(1996) (describing the contradiction o f the capital imperative and the political imperative of
the U.S. nation-state).
57.

Id.

58. CALAVITA, supra note 24, at 180.
59.

Id.

at 179.

60.

Id.

at 180.

61. This was a comment made repeatedly at the Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting program organized by the Section on Immigration and Section on Labor
and Employment Law, titled Guest Worker Programs: Proposals and Perspectives, Golden
Gate Law School, Jan. 5, 2005.
62. Pending now in Congress is the Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security
Act of 2005, S. 359, H.R. 884, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter AgJobs], sponsored by
Senators Larry Craig and Edward Kennedy and Representatives Howard Berman and Chris
Cannon. AgJobs contains an explicit legalization provision for agricultural workers, through
a new concept called "earned legalization." For a discussion of AgJobs, including a
description of its provisions and an analysis of why it was not passed in the past, see Lauren
Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the
Aglobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming Summer 2005). Under earned
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the H-2A program for agricultural workers and the H-2B program for
non-agricultural and low-skilled workers.63 Both programs proffer
nonimmigrant visas that bear no relationship to permanent residence
or citizenship.64 In the fiscal year 2002, a total of 102,615 workers were
admitted into the United States for temporary work under these
programs, primarily under the H-2B program.65 The H-2A program
has historically been very small, issuing less than 40,000 visas per year
in an industry that is estimated to employ up to four million workers
annually.66
One question that must be asked is whether it would be accurate to
raise the specter of a new bracero program in the form of Bush's
temporary-worker proposal, when the H-2A program is a temporary
agricultural worker program that is generally acknowledged as the
legacy of the bracero program.67 In fact, the H-2A program has been
called the "New Bracero Program."68 Certainly, the failure of Bush to
numerically limit the program in his announcement fueled reaction by
critics seeking to curb illegal immigration or to stop immigration
altogether. Similarly, these critics were motivated by the presumption
that the program would lead to legalization. But for those who
charged that Bush's proposal must be condemned as a guest-worker
program, why has the H-2A program escaped the onslaught of recent
criticism ?69
legalization, applicants must prove a past history of agricultural work in the United States
(at least 200 days in the previous year), then register and continue to work in agriculture
during a subsequent period (at least 360 more days in the next six years). If AgJobs were
ever enacted, the law would provide the opportunity for up to 500,000 agricultural workers
to legalize. See Fact Sheet, Nat'! Council of La Raza, Fact Sheet: Agricultural Jobs
Opportunity,
Benefits,
and
Security
Act
of
2003
(AgJOBS),
at
http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/download/2609 (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
63. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b) (2000).
64. For a comparison of these programs, see Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker
Programs in the United States, 10 TEX. H ISP . J.L. & POL'Y 79 (2004), and Medige, supra note

42.
65. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 1 18-19 tbl.26 (2003), fhereinafter 2002
YEARBOOK] (documenting nonimmigrants admitted by class of admission, selected fiscal
years
1985-2002),
at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statisticsffEMP02yrbk/
Temp2002.pdf.
66. See Another Bracero Program Considered, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=30_0_4_0 (last visited April 8, 2005).

at

67. See Beth Lyon, When More "Security " Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering
U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 588
(2004).
68. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons From the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law,
55 ME. L. REV. 157, 161 (2003).
69. For a critique of the H-2A program, see Laura C. Oliveira, A License to Exploit: The
Need to Reform the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Guest Worker Program, 5 SCHOLAR 153
(2002).
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One response to the Bush proposal, coming from David
Limbaugh, columnist and brother of radio talk show host Rush
Limbaugh, raised divergent concerns. He asked:
And why are we even talking about fairness in the same breath with
illegal aliens? Do we owe them a duty of fairness? . . . What many
opponents of loose immigration fear is not the influx of foreigners in
American society, nor the immigrants themselves, who can't be blamed
for wanting a better life and who would likely welcome assimilation into
our culture. Rather, it is the deliberate destruction of the unique

American culture and American civilization by 'multiculturalists. '70

To understand the connection made by Limbaugh between illegal
aliens and the destruction of American culture and civilization by
multiculturalists, we can tum to Samuel Huntington, who links
multiculturalist criticism of American identity with illegal immigration
in his new book Who Are We. In his book, Huntington argues that the
United States ignores the failure of Mexicans to assimilate into
mainstream U.S. culture at the nation's peril.71 America, says
Huntington, was created by settlers who were overwhelmingly white,
British and Protestant. With the "achievements of the civil rights
movement and the Nationality Act of 1965," race "virtually
disappeared" as a defining component of national identity.72 Instead,
American identity is defined in terms of "culture and creed" - whose
bedrock remains the Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding
settlers.73 This culture, laments Huntington, came under assault in the
late twentieth century by the doctrines of multiculturalism and
diversity, the rise of group identities based on race, ethnicity, and
gender, the effect of transnational diasporas and immigrants with dual
loyalties, and the growing salience of cosmopolitan identities.74 But the
greatest challenge today comes from "the immense and continuing
immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the
fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white
American natives."75
70. January: The Last Straw? Bush's Guest-Worker Gamble, RIGHT WING WATCH
ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2004 (quoting David Limbaugh), at http://www .pfaw.org/pfaw/general/
default.aspx?oid=13565.
71. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8; see also Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge,
FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2004, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story/2495.
php. [hereinafter Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge].
72. Huntington,

The Hispanic Challenge, supra note

71, at 1.

73. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at xv-xvi.
74. Huntington,

The Hispanic Challenge, supra note

71, at 2.

75. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, supra note 71, at 2. For a response to
Huntington's concern about fertility rates, see Mireya Navarro, For Younger Latinos, A Shift
to Smaller Families, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at Al. For multiple responses pointing out
endemic factual misstatements in Huntington's book, see www.foreignpolicy.com.
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There are numerous contradictions contained within Huntington's
argument, for one, his argument that "race has disappeared" as a
defining component of national identity, even while he seeks to limit
national identity to the "Anglo-Protestant culture and creed."76 Here
Huntington attempts to distinguish racial distinctions between people
from racial distinctions between cultures. Because he focuses on
cultures and not people, he believes he is not engaging in racial
distinctions.77 But concerns about cultural difference serve as proxies
for racial concerns about people.78 Presumptions about fitness for
membership in the United States have always rested upon ideas about
assimilability.79 In considering which immigrant cultures are capable of
assimilation into the United States, Huntington stereotypes cultures in
a fashion that will leave many readers incredulous, for example, he
states that Anglo-Protestant culture, unlike Mexican culture, values
hard work.80 Thus, he can argue that he does not object to Mexican
people, per se, but only to Mexican cultural values. Obviously,
whether one considers hard work a Mexican or Anglo-Protestant
cultural value depends upon whom one centers as the prototypical
Mexican or Anglo-Protestant. The fact that Huntington can disparage
a monolithic - and mythical - Mexican culture as not valuing hard
work shows that race remains a defining component of his analysis
through a hierarchy of cultures.
For our purposes in this Review, let us focus on Huntington's
discussion of "illegality" as a factor differentiating Mexican
immigration from past and most other contemporary immigration to
the United States. He writes:
Substantial illegal entry into the United States is a post-1965 and
Mexican phenomenon. For almost a century after the Constitution was
adopted, illegal immigration was virtually impossible: no national laws
restricted or prohibited immigration, and only a few states imposed
modest limits. During the following ninety years, illegal immigration was
minimal: control of immigrants coming by ship was fairly easy, and a
good proportion of those arriving at Ellis Island were denied entry. The
1 965 immigration law, the increased availability of transportation, and

76. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at xvii.
77.

Id.

78. For the argument that culture is the terrain on which racism is most often today
expressed, see Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1600-04 (1996).
79. For a discussion of the way in which cultural difference is both presumed and
exaggerated, so that immigrants of color are described as inassimilable into Western norms,
in particular in the context of gendered treatment, see id., Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for
Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89 (2000), and Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus
Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 181 (2001).
80. Huntington,

The Hispanic Challenge, supra

note 71, at 12.
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the intensified forces promoting Mexican emigration drastically changed
this situation.81

But Impossible Subjects shows us the many errors in Huntington's
claim. Illegal entry became a phenomenon not after 1965, but in the
1920s. Illegal immigration before that period was "minimal" and
"easily controlled" not because fewer immigrants were seeking entry
but because there were fewer laws that made immigrants illegal as well
as less surveillance. Illegal immigration post 1965 is perceived as a
"Mexican" problem because assigning Mexico only 20,000 annual slots
for lawful immigration has rendered illegal a large proportion of the
Mexican population that sought entry. And the achievements of the
1965 Immigration Act hardly include making race disappear as a
defining component of national identity. Instead, its formal equality
against a background of unequal distributions of wealth and
opportunity allow illegal immigration to be defined as "Mexican."
Moreover, if Huntington is concerned with illegal immigration, he
might consider the phenomenon of visa overstayers, who make up
one-third of all undocumented immigrants in the United States,82 and
contemplate the history - and present day phenomenon - of white
illegal immigrants.83
In Ngai's words, the illegal alien is an "impossible subject" - a
"person who cannot be" - as a person whose very identity is defined
through the illegality of his existence (p. 5). And the illegal alien is
also an "impossible subject," as a "problem that cannot be solved." (p.
5). But Impossible Subjects shows us how the distinction between legal
and illegal immigration came into being, which might give us hope that
there may be ways to think creatively about illegal immigration as a
problem. Yet we also see the hardened nature of the racialization of
the "illegal alien," which might make us despair. Illegal and legal are
mutable categories in immigration law. But the link between race and
"illegal alien" seems immutable. As Louis Menand has written, the
characterizations of immigrants as "legal" and "illegal" are not only

81. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 225.
82.

See Homeland Security Overstay, supra note

7.

83. Canada ranked in the top fifteen in a 2000 estimate by the INS of countries of origin
of illegal immigrants; a previous 1996 study estimated the country to rank fourth. See Jack
Jedwab, Canadian Aliens: The Numbers and Status of Our "Illegals" South of the Border,
(Canadian-American Research Symposium on Immigration, Niagara Falls, Ont.) Apr. 26,
2003, at http://www.acs-aec.ca/Polls/Poll29.pdf. While these individuals might be of any
race, only 13.4% of Canadians are so-called "visible minorities." See James McCarten,
Canada's Mosaic More Colourful, Crowded Than Ever, Candian Press, Jan. 21, 2003,
available at http://65 .109. 70.118/sections.php ?op=viewarticle&artid= 1741.
As a regional matter, in 1994, the largest community of undocumented persons in New
York state was Italian, followed by Ecuadorian, Polish, Irish, and then Russian. See Jeff
Yang & Karen Lam, Could it Happen Here?, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 6, 1994, at 14.
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always subject to change, they also do not tell us anything about the
desirability of the persons so constructed.84 In other words, we must
maintain a consistent practice of disaggregating the notion of illegal
immigration from its subsuming of particular individuals or entire
racial groups. Centering the history of the European illegal alien may
be helpful in this regard, in dislodging the racialization of the illegal
alien.
II.

ALIEN CITIZENS

If the "illegal alien" is racialized as Mexican, the generic "alien" is
racialized as Asian. In contrast to the immigrant, who carries within
herself that teleology of settlement, assimilation, and citizenship, the
alien is not presumed to be able to access lawful admission,85 let alone
citizenship. The Asian is the quintessential alien. Asians were
excluded from immigration in legislation first directed against
Chinese, and then against the "barred Asiatic zone," stretching all the
way from Afghanistan to the Pacific with the exceptions of Japan,
which the State Department did not wish to offend, and the
Philippines, which was a U.S. colony. In 1924 Asian exclusion was
made complete with the statutory exclusion of Japanese, excluded
along with all other aliens "ineligible to naturalize," fusing Asians into
one unassimilable and undigestible race, and as utterly foreign to
American national identity.86
The citizen and the alien are oppositional terms; placing them
together suggests a dissonance, an inappropriateness. The alien is not
supposed to engage in citizenship.87 And the citizen can no longer be
an alien. Thus the alien citizen also seems an "impossible subject. "88
84. Menand is relying here upon Ngai's research. Louis Menand, Patriot Games: The
New Nativism of Samuel P. Huntington,

NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 92.

85. Just as I use the word "immigrant" more broadly than is technically appropriate
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, here I use the word "alien" more broadly as
well. Technically speaking, legal permanent residents are referred to as "aliens" in the Act.
But in common parlance, legal permanent residents are more commonly referred to as
"immigrants." By "alien" here I refer to the category of person who stands outside what
Hiroshi Motomura would refer to as the "citizen-in-waiting," in other words, one who is
racially removed from incorporation into the national citizenry. Motomura, supra note 2.
86. Pp. 96-126. Filipinos were turned from nationals to aliens with the Tydings
McDuffie Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 456, which granted the colony
independence. Ngai's chapter 3, From Colonial Subject to Undesirable Alien: Filipino
Migration in the Invisible Empire, explains how Filipinos occupied the anomalous status of
American nationals, as subjects of a U.S. colony, from the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines
in 1898 up to the point of transition to independence from the United States in 1934. She
analyses Filipinos as experiencing a corporeality of contradictions: they experienced a
colonialism that has been denied through the doctrine of American exceptionalism and they
lived the contradiction between domestic racism and the assertion of the idea of benevolent
assimilation. Id. at 96-126.
87. See, e.g., Editorial, A Citizen's Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A22 (suggesting
that noncitizens not be allowed to vote in New York City). But see JENNIFER GORDON,
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But "alien citizenship" does capture the particular racialization of
Asian Americans.89 Although literal citizens, through naturalization,
or through birth, and thus Americans in terms of formal legal
citizenship, Asian Americans have historically not been considered
Americans in terms of kinship, or belonging. The foreignness essential
to the racialization of Asian Americans90 has operated to vitiate the
notion that Asian Americans stand at the center of national
membership. Thus, it may be useful to disaggregate the nation and
state from each other in considering the relationship of racialization to
the nation-state. Asians constituted as aliens had citizenship in neither
state nor nation. Asian Americans, constituted as alien citizens, had
citizenship in the state, but not the nation. This partial citizenship
produced vulnerability when one's identity was not a matter of
national indifference, but formed the very substance against which
national identity coalesced.91
Important to consider is the relationship between alien citizenship
and ideas of gender and family.92 Contained within the normal
trajectory of lawful permanent resident to citizen is the presumption
of a normative heterosexual family.93 The Asian as alien has been cast
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005) (mentioning the
Legal A liens, Local Citizens: The
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.

concept of "alien citizenship"); Jamin B. Raskin,

1391 (1993) (documenting both historical and present-day noncitizen voting); Linda
Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(elaborating on the concept of "alien citizenship").
88. I mean this primarily in the first of Ngai's two senses, as a person who cannot be. To
think of alien citizens as a problem which cannot be solved might suggest that Asian
Americans, as defined as antithetical to American citizenship, can never be assimilated into
citizenship. But as who is cast out from citizenship is contingent and not stable, a more
accurate prediction might be that someone or some groups will always occupy the category
alien vis-a-vis the American citizen; the alien may not always and for all purposes be Asian.
89. This seems true for Mexican Americans as well (witness the "repatriation" program
referenced above), but I am confining my discussion here to Asian Americans.
90. On the racialization of Asian Americans as foreign, see Neil Gotanda, Comparative
Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee,

47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000).

91. This provides a different articulation of what, in other publications, I have
differentiated as citizenship as formal status and citizenship as identity. See, e.g., Leti Volpp,
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002). The notion of citizenship in the
nation versus citizenship as identity seems productive in thinking about how to capture
nationalism produced against those who lack this form of citizenship. For a masterful
disaggregation of forms of citizenship, see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
92.

I

am indebted to David Eng for suggesting this point.

93. That our immigration laws presume heterosexual family relations is made evident in
the fact that same-sex spouses cannot be admitted into the United States as immediate
relatives, unlike heterosexual spouses. Moreover, until 1990 gay and lesbian noncitizens
were barred altogether from entering the United States. For a discussion of these laws see
STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, THIRD EDmON
151-64 (2002). See generally EITHNE LUIBHEID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY
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out from this trajectory through a racial categorization that depicted
the Chinese male immigrant as sexually deviant for his lack of access
to Chinese women and the Chinese female immigrant as sexually
deviant as a presumptive prostitute.94 Both depictions reflected
patterns in early Chinese immigrant population, patterns shaped by
immigration laws.95 The racial characterization of the Chinese
immigrant as inassimilable and strange relied upon notions of normal
sexual relations, which were conceptualized only as occurring within
the heterosexual marital relationship. Furthermore, the Chinese
immigrant was denied access to reproducing a family, which
additionally produced the Chinese as aberrant, alien, and non-citizen,
given the notion of the family as the foundation of civil society.
Gender is an undertheorized category in Impossible Subjects. The
reader wonders how the policies Ngai described specifically affected
women,96 and how those policies were motivated by presumptions
about gender. The metaphoric association between nation and family
is a rich one, and it is difficult to imagine that exclusionary policies
about national belonging did not invoke ideas about kinship or
reproduction.97
The notion of Asian Americans as engaged in family relationships
that were defective, as different from the desired norm, was an issue in
Japanese American internment camps, as I will explain. Japanese
American internment, writes Ngai, stands as the most extreme case of
alien citizenship (p. 175). The U.S. government imprisoned some
80,000 American citizens, and 40,000 noncitizens in internment
camps between the years 1942 and 1945. While the government did
not formally strip Japanese Americans of their citizenship, it was, in
effect, "nullified" (p. 175).
Military evacuation orders, as she suggests, rhetorically effaced the
citizenship of the 80,000 citizens, by ordering "all persons of Japanese
ancestry, both aliens, and non-aliens," to report to assembly centers

AT THE BORDER (2003).
94. See DAVID ENG, RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY IN ASIAN
AMERICA (2001 ) ; GEORGE PEFFER, IF THEY DON'T BRING THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE
FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION (1999); NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES:
EPIDEMICS AND RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN (2001).
95.

See sources cited supra

note 94.

96. Today a substantial share of undocumented immigrants are women. See
Undocumented Immigration: Facts and Figures (2004), at http:/1216.239.63.104/search?q=
cache:Er4lpCobjKUJ:www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf+
+undocumented+immigrants+women&hl=en (estimating that women made up 41 percent of
the adult undocumented population). It is not apparent to the reader what the estimated
gender breakdown of illegal immigration might have been in the 1924 to 1965 period.
97. For the association of these notions in another context, see RHODA ANN
KANAANEH, B IRTHING THE NATION: STRATEGIES OF PALESTINIAN WOMEN IN ISRAEL
(2002).
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for evacuation (p. 175). Obviously, "citizen" and "non-alien" are not
equivalent terms. The first promises a panoply of rights and
guarantees; the other only speaks a negation, one that provides no
guidance as to the positive status of the person nor any sense as to
where she might ground her rights. By subsuming citizenship identity
within the enemy alien status of "Japanese ancestry," and by
incarcerating citizens for the duration of the war, the U.S. government
severed the link that Hannah Arendt claimed as so fundamental.
Citizenship, Arendt wrote, is nothing less than the "right to have
rights."98 But citizenship must be recognized by the state that would be
the guarantor of those rights.
Ngai works through different conceptions of citizenship to explain
the policies enacted against Japanese Americans through internment.
In the camps, Japanese Americans were aggressively reeducated in an
effort to instruct them in American cultural assimilation (p. 177).
Programs within the camps were touted as Americanizing projects and
a testimony to the value of American democracy. Thus, Ansel Adams
could label a photograph of Japanese teenaged girls in the Manzanar
camp: "Manzanar is only a detour on the road to American
citizenship" (pp. 178-79).
These young girls were presumably American citizens as a matter
of birthright, a citizenship whose associated rights, as interned citizens,
they could not enjoy. We could read Adams's label to suggest that
Manzanar was a necessary detour to allow Japanese Americans to
better learn how to be American citizens before they could realize
their rights as American citizens. Ngai describes the forms of
citizenship Japanese Americans were to learn in the camps as cultural
citizenship and political citizenship. To develop political citizenship,
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) set up programs of self
government meant to tutor Japanese Americans in democratic
processes. WRA policy limited leadership positions in these programs,
which created community councils of elected block representatives, to
U.S. citizens; further, meetings had to be conducted only in English.
As Ngai suggests, this led many Japanese Americans to reject these
programs as divisive and as dismissive of older family and community
members (p. 180).
Cultural citizenship was a project of inculcating American mores
and traditions considered more conducive to liberal citizenship than
Japanese culture, which was stigmatized as traditional and feudal. As
Caroline Chung Simpson and Orin Starn have demonstrated, Japanese
98. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1951). As Arendt
writes, "The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable - even in
countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who
were no longer citizens of any sovereign state." Id. at 293.
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culture was the subject of serious study in the camps. The WRA
established an anthropological study of Japanese Americans in the
camps, for the explicit .purpose of developing theories of Japanese
behavior that would be useful after the war when the United States
occupied Japan.99 What the anthropologists theorized was a tense
duality between Japan and America, played out as intergenerational
conflict between Issei (traditional) and Nissei (modern), which
suggested that the Japanese American had to be freed from the value
of filial piety into a modern existence in America. Within the camps,
Japanese Americans were aggressively reeducated to abandon
traditional family practices thought to inhibit the "natural"
development of character that would allow one to progress.100
The political disenfranchisement of Japanese Americans, thrust
from citizenship into the category of the "enemy alien," was in part
justified through this purported cultural difference.101 Now, this
cultural difference was to be shed in internment camp as a
precondition for successful incorporation into the American way of
life. Thus, Manzanar, in the eyes of Adams and the War Relocation
Authority, potentially constituted not only a detour, but a necessary
reeducation process before American citizenship.
But the camps must not be remembered solely as locations for
experimentation in anthropology and education. They were also the
site of enormous anxiety. Ngai explains in careful detail the result of
the 1944 Denationalization Act, which authorized citizens to make
voluntary renunciation of citizenship if the renunciation was not
considered detrimental to the interests of the United States. Voluntary

99. See CAROLINE CHUNG SIMPSON, AN ABSENT PRESENCE: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN
POSTWAR AMERICAN CULTURE, 1945-1960, at 43-45 (2001). As Simpson argues, the
anthropological study not only reflected the American propensity for seeing Japanese
Americans as Japanese aliens, but also assisted in constructing a particular idea about the
culture and character of both Japanese and Japanese Americans. Id. at 45-47; see also Orin
Starn, Engineering Internment: Anthropologists and the War Relocation A uthority, 13 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 700 (1986).
100. See SIMPSON, supra note 99. Ngai does not address ideas about family in her
discussion of culture in the camps, but focuses upon the use of native language, kinship
structures of leadership, religion, and recreational activities.
101.

As Justice Murphy wrote in Korematsu in a sharply-worded dissent:

In support of this blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no
reliable evidence is cited . . . .

Justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable racial and
sociological grounds . . . . Individuals of Japanese ancestry are condemned because they are
said to be a "large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by
strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion."

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236-37 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). For
discussion, see Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 933 (2004).
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renunciation was conceptualized by Attorney General Francis Biddle
as a means of distinguishing loyal from disloyal Japanese Americans;
presumably only those disloyal to the United States would choose to
renounce their U.S. citizenship, facilitating the release of all internees
who chose to keep their citizenship (p. 187). An earlier attempt at
sorting loyal from disloyal had relied upon the Leave Clearance
questionnaire, which had been issued to all internees over the age of
seventeen.102 This earlier attempt was a failure. Many more
purportedly disloyal Japanese Americans were identified than
expected. Loyalty and disloyalty acquired perverse meanings for
citizens imprisoned by their own government, who were now asked to
agree to serve in the U.S. military and renounce any allegiance to
Japan.103
Many Japanese Americans approached renunciation with the
belief that it was the only way to remain in camp. From our present
vantage point, it might seem strange that Japanese Americans would
choose to remain in camp, but internees felt enormous fear that they
would face violence, be separated from their families, or be drafted
into the military if they left.
Five thousand, five hundred citizens chose to renounce their
citizenship. In Tule Lake, the camp segregated for disloyals after the
Leave Clearance questionnaire, eighty-five percent of citizens over
seventeen renounced their citizenship. Exemplifying the mental strain
under which some were operating is the following passage, written by
an internee who had renounced his citizenship as "the one last thing I
could do to express my fury toward the government of the United
States" (p. 192):
They got me ! The American government threw me into a concentration
camp, labeled me dangerous because I wouldn't declare my loyalty,
intimidated me, and subjected me to extreme mental and physical stress.
In fact, the government did such a good job of manipulating me that I
just gave up my United States citizenship - voluntarily! Now they could
deport me to Japan without any trouble at all, I realized.104

102. The Leave Clearance questionnaire was issued to camp residents in 1943. Question
#27 asked: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty
wherever ordered?" Question #28 asked: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the
United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese
emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" See ERIC YAMAMOTO
ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT 197-98 (2001). Those who answered "no" to both questions were known as
"no-no boys." See JOHN OKADA, No-No BOY ( 1976).

103. Renunciation of allegiance to Japan meant statelessness for the lssei, who had no
birthright citizenship in the United States and were racially ineligible to naturalize.
104. P. 192 (quoting MINORU KIYOTA, BEYOND
1 11-12 (Linda Kepinger Keenan trans., 1997)).
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Wayne Collins, an ACLU lawyer, engaged in a heroic battle for
thirteen years to restore citizenship to the 5,409 renunciates who
sought to regain it, using the argument that citizenship had been
renounced under conditions of duress and coercion inculcated not
only by the internment but also by Japanese nationalists in the camps
(p. 195). Ngai is careful to point out that this legal approach necessary as legal strategy, but which has shaped subsequent scholarly
representations of the renunciates - reproduces the very stereotypes
of Japanese culture as patriarchal, coercive and fanatical that underlay
both the internment and the cultural citizenship project (p. 200). What
is missing from the narrative, she asserts, is the role of individual
agency and dual nationalism in actually producing renunciation (pp.
199-200). But when the Asian American political project of seeking
acceptance as full citizens has been precisely grounded on the denial
of dual nationalism or complicated loyalties, it is not surprising that
representations of the renunciates have submerged any ties to
Japanese nationalism. As perpetual foreigners, Asian Americans have
had to deny their foreignness in order to be accepted into
citizenship.105 And the idea of Japanese American loyalty to the
United States, exemplified through valorous military service, has been
pivotal to the grounding of the movement for redress.106
But after invoking dual nationalism, Ngai steps away, describing it
as only a weak dual nationalism that was felt by the renunciates.
Instead, she writes, we must think of Japanese Americans as above all
"pragmatic people" who made "pragmatic choices that were neither
irrational nor primarily motivated by nationalist politics," and who
"were no different from most ordinary people, who are concerned
more with their individual and family's well-being than with the
interests of the nation-state" (p. 200). I am struck by Ngai's language
here, which suggests the need to cast the Japanese Americans who
renounced their citizenship into the language of pragmatism,
ordinariness, rationality, individuality and the unit of the family. This
is the language we use when we want to assert the humanity of actors
who are otherwise thought to be not quite human, through grounding

105. The reluctance to envision Asian Americans as having linkages outside of the
American nation seems to have shaped a historical reluctance to examine ties of
transnationality. The anthropologist Sylvia Yanagisako has shown this in an examination of
Asian American history course syllabi; she notes that historical demands for exclusive
national allegiance by the United States seem replicated through the curricular inclusion of
only people, relations. communities. and institutions located on U.S. soil as the field of
inquiry. See Sylvia Yanagisako. TransforminJ< Orienta/ism: Gender, Nationality, and Class in
Asian American Studies, in NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL
ANALYSIS 275 (Sylvia Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995).

106. See Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of
A cquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV.
385 (1999).
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their behavior in explicitly Western concepts of the human.107 Perhaps
this is not surprising in writing about a context in which Japanese
Americans were interned precisely because they were not seen as
individuals who could be discerned as loyal or disloyal.108 But we might
pause to consider what underlies this depiction, which is the
association of the idea of the human with the individual, the rational
actor, and the family member. I would caution that this association
risks lessening the enforcement of rights of those who do not fit within
normative constructs of the human and the citizen.
What has been arguably even more forgotten by historical memory
than Japanese American citizenship renunciation is the Chinese
Confession Program. The Confession Program addressed an illegal
immigration that was both foundational to the existence of the
Chinese American community and concealed. Ngai estimates that at
least twenty-five percent of the Chinese American community in 1950
was unlawfully present (p. 204); some estimate that at least one-half of
all Chinese immigrants entered illegally during the exclusion era,
which spanned the late nineteenth century through 1943 (p. 204).
Because only merchants, teachers, treaty traders and diplomats were
granted immigrant visas, the primary alternative for entry was for a
Chinese immigrant to falsely claim that he was entitled to enter as the
child of a Chinese American citizen, through what was called
"derivative citizenship. "109 These illegal claims to derivative
citizenship, establishing what were called "paper sons" - sons only on
paper - occurred in the context of racist exclusion.11° Nonetheless,
this was an illegality which was shameful, dangerous, and rarely
discussed.
Central to the problem of the illegal immigration of Chinese was
the inability of the state to authenticate identity. Ngai describes an

107. Here I would reference the concern that Asians and Asian Americans are
persistently described as motivated by culture in a way that white Americans are not. As a
case in point, one could look to media depictions of Chai Soua Vang, currently indicted for
killing six deer hunters, and who was reported to be a "shaman Hmong healer" who "seeks
the aid of the spirit world." Stephen Kinzer, Hmong Hunter Charged With 6 Murders is a
Shaman, Friends and Family Say, N.Y. DMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al8. This is not to say that
Vang, or any other Asian American, is unmotivated by culture. Rather, we must all be
understood to be both individual agents and shaped by cultural forces, in which are
embedded political and material histories and pressures.
108. On the differing treatment of German Americans and Italian Americans, who,
unlike Japanese Americans, were able to access individual loyalty hearings and escape mass
internment, see YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 102, at 175-76.
109. P. 204. Other alternatives were for Chinese to use fake merchant certificates or to
claim they were American citizens by birth (pp. 204-05).
110. P. 206 (writing that Chinese, who believed that exclusion was immoral, even if it
was legal, "believed paper immigration was morally justified because it was one of the few
ways to enter the United States when exclusion made legal immigration impossible). Id.
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upwardly spiraling body of evidentiary requirements which ironically
created the documentation of citizenship (p. 205). This was a
citizenship premised on oral claims that had been followed - and
"authenticated" - by certificates of identity, passports, and a
subsequent chain of legitimized relatives.
The only way to undo this documentation was through the same
process that originally created it - through oral testimony and
interrogation, in the form of the confession (p. 206). The Confession
Program was launched in the context of extreme pressure on the one
hundred-five-person annual quota established for Chinese
immigration in the 1943 Magnuson Act (which had lifted Chinese
exclusion).111 Turmoil in China after the Chinese Revolution led
1 17 ,000 Chinese American derivative citizens to apply for U.S.
passports at the United States Consulate in Hong Kong in 1950 (p.
206). The U.S. government responded with an escalating series of
requirements in an unsuccessful attempt to cut down on numbers.112
This overwhelming task loomed in a context where applicants were
thought more likely to be Chinese spies than actual derivative citizens.
By the mid-1950s Red China was American's primary enemy (p. 208).
In 1956 the INS launched the Confession Program, inspired by the
experience of uncovering one individual who turned out not to be a
citizen, thus exposing the fact that thirty-four putative relatives of his
were not citizens either. But the service had sufficient evidence to
deport only three of them. After learning that ten of the alleged
relatives were veterans, the INS explained to them that if they
confessed they would be eligible for naturalized citizenship under their
real names. After extensive family consultation, all confessed. The
Service "had thus discovered a method of exposing an entire family
tree."113
The Program, approved by the INS central office and without any
statutory authorization, created a procedure for an administrative
adjustment of status. If an individual confessed to having entered by
fraudulent means, he would be assisted - if possible - to legalize his
status. If he had served in the armed services for ninety days, he was
eligible for naturalized citizenship. If he had resided continually in the
United States for seven years, he was eligible for permanent residency
under suspension of deportation. But the INS held out the possibility
of relief only to confessors who named all the names of those in their
families. The list was cross-checked against the statements of other
1 1 1. Magnuson Act, Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.
1 12. These requirements were often difficult if not impossible to meet and included:
blood tests to prove paternity, bone X-rays to prove age, photographs from childhood,
affidavits from the American father in triplicate, and so forth. P. 207.
1 13. P. 219. The Program also followed grand juries that were impaneled in 1956 to
investigate fraudulent entry by Chinese in San Francisco and New York. Pp. 221-28.
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family members, a tedious process that meant that confession could
take an entire year (pp. 219-21).
From 1957 to 1965 at least 1 1,336 Chinese Americans confessed.
Another 19,124 were implicated as holding false citizenship by the
confessions of others. The vast majority received legal status; of those
who were found ineligible, a small percentage was deported.
Presumably, the derivative citizens waiting in Hong Kong who were
relatives of those who confessed and were then identified as false
citizens were no longer able to enter the United States. Ngai suggests
that the Confession Program served "as a means of renegotiating the
terms of Chinese Americans' citizenship" (p. 223). Many Chinese
Americans resisted the state's efforts to criminalize the entire
community through engaging in citizenship practices of legal
opposition and lobbying. These practices may have been important to
the INS's decision to create the carrot of legalized status in return for
confession, rather than to simply use the stick of criminal prosecution
(p. 223).
Yet confession did not lead to redemption. Ngai writes the
community "could not entirely redeem its virtue" during the Cold War
and against a backdrop of a racialized vision of all Chinese as illegal
and dangerous (p. 223). Thus, confession provided legal status,
including formal citizenship, for many paper immigrants, but this
status did not produce "social legitimacy" (p. 223). While Chinese
Americans, through confession, were given the opportunity for
legitimated formal citizenship in the state, they were still denied
citizenship in the nation. The nation had been mapped, in part,
through their exclusion, and rectifying their formal citizenship would
not shift this construction.114 President Franklin Roosevelt had stated
in 1943 that Chinese exclusion was a "historic mistake" and an
"injustice to our friends. "115 Whether a similar statement would have
been made at the height of the Cold War, and whether the carrot of
legalization would have been proffered were it not for the hope of
rooting out fraud and deception among those considered proxies for
an enemy nation, appears unlikely.
To think of alien citizens as "impossible subjects" in Ngai's second
sense, as a "problem that cannot be solved," could suggest that Asian
Americans, as defined as antithetical to American citizenship, can
never be fully assimilated into the American nation. But we might also

1 14. Here we could consider Lisa Lowe's statement that "the American of Asian
descent remains the symbolic 'alien,' the metonym for Asia who by definition cannot be
imagined as sharing in America." LOWE, supra note 56, at 6.
115. As Ngai points out, the admission of this mistake did not serve as a basis for an
amnesty program that would have legalized all Chinese who entered during the exclusion
period. Pp. 223-24.
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theorize the persistence of the category of alien citizenship as not
inevitably linked to Asian American racialization, but as a category
whose content may shift depending on U.S. foreign policy. The war in
which we are presently engaged has been dubbed the "war on terror."
With no specific national target, and thus no particular nationals to
consider the agents of foreign states, the war on terror aims at a
loosely defined group of individuals dubbed "terrorists." The "alien
citizens" associated with this enemy are Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian Americans.116
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Americans now possess a
citizenship which is both more broadly and more diffusely at risk than
that of Japanese Americans during World War II, as the war on terror
is not country-specific. Just as Japanese Americans were subsumed
under the category "Japanese" during World War II, the racialization
of this group is subsumed into the category of the putative "terrorist."
If these alien citizens are considered terrorists, we might think about
the tension between the terms alien, citizen, and terrorist. Both
terrorist and alien constitute opposites to the idea of the citizen.
Terrorist and alien are sometimes synonymous. The term "domestic
terrorist" is necessary because of the unstated presumption that the
terrorist is not domestic, but foreign, and an alien.117 Governmental
responses in the war on terror have primarily targeted noncitizens,
aliens who are purportedly terrorists.118 Guantanamo has become a
repository for noncitizens indefinitely detained as "enemy
combatants. " And the category of the visa overstayer has been newly
racialized as "terrorist" after the September 1 1 th attacks, due to the
fact that four of the hijackers had overstayed their visas.119
Terrorist and citizen are oppositional terms. Thus the "terrorist
citizen" seems also an impossible subject. Putative terrorists are not
considered deserving of the protections of citizenship. A recent
nationwide poll conducted by Cornell University revealed that nearly
half of all Americans believe that the U.S. government should restrict

1 16. For explanations of this racialization, see Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by
92 CAL. L. REV. 1259

Law: Post-September 11th Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion,
(2004), and Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 91.

117. See, e.g. , John
United States, 16 WASH.

Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the
U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 230 (2004) (referring to Timothy McVeigh as a

"domestic terrorist").
118. For the argument that the war on terror has targeted unpopular noncitizens,
reflecting historical patterns of incursions on civil liberties and auguring future measures
against citizens, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
119. See Homeland Security
visa overstaying and terrorism).

Overstay, supra

note 7 (exemplifying the linkage between
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the civil liberties of Muslim Americans.120 Moreover, being marked as
a terrorist has correlated with the loss of one's formal citizenship. We
can think here of Yaser Hamdi, whose 2004 settlement agreement
with federal prosecutors required him to renounce his U.S. citizenship
as a condition of his release.121 We could also consider an increasing
number of cases where prosecutors have sought to denaturalize U.S.
citizens accused of engaging in terrorist activity or providing material
support for organizations certified as terrorist organizations.122 Thus,
we can see as with the Japanese American renunciates, the discomfort
with transnational ties and split loyalties at a time of war manifest in
the notion that citizenship demands singular loyalties.123 And the
notion of the American citizen has consolidated through concerns
about national security, against the idea of the terrorist.124
We can see present-day connections to the Chinese Confession
Program, which seems to be a precursor of visa programs which
provide lawful immigration status in exchange for the noncitizen
providing the government critical, reliable information in criminal

120. See Poll Shows U. S. Views on Muslim-Americans, Nearly Half of Those Surveyed
Say Some Rights Should be Restricted, MSNBC NEWS, Dec. 17, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/6729916.
121. See Settlement Agreement, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrement2.html.
There are several issues to consider in his case: whether the citizenship renunciation
passes muster as "voluntary" when he agreed to the renunciation as a condition of release;
whether his status as a citizen of Saudi Arabia, as an Arab, and as an "accidental" citizen of
the United States through birth on U.S. soil from nonimmigrant parents has engendered a
different treatment than in the case of John Walker Lindh, who faced rhetorical calls for the
stripping of his citizenship but none in practice; and whether the impetus for the
renunciation on the part of the U.S. government was symbolic or in fact was to enable the
U.S. to claim in the future that he can be dealt with through immigration law as an "alien"
with lesser or nonexistent Constitutional protections.
122. See e.g., Todd Bensom, Government Moves to Strip Citizenship of Former Holy
Land Foundation Board Member, GARMO.COM, Oct. 18, 2004 (describing the case of Rasmi
Khader Almallah), at http://www.garmo.com/archives/00000394/shtml; U.S. Muslim Official
Pleads Not Guilty, Bail Denied, MUSLIM AM. Soc'Y, Oct. 29, 2003 (describing the case of
Abdurahman Alamoudi), at http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=623.
123. We can see this as well for citizens who do not fall into the "alien citizen " category
in the provisions of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (known as Patriot Act II). This
is draft legislation that was prepared within the federal Department of Justice, which has yet
to be proposed in Congress. This legislation would provide for the presumptive
denationalization of American citizens charged with "joining or serving in or providing
material support to" an organization that the executive branch has designated a terrorist
organization. See Memorandum Obtained by NOW Television Program, Domestic
Security Enhancement Act of 2003, Section-by-Section Analysis 30-33 (Jan. 9, 2003)
(analyzing
Title
V:
Enhancing
Immigration
and
Border
Security),
at
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf.
For a discussion of the relationship between denationalization and split allegiances, see
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories ofLoss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471 (1986).
124. See Volpp,

The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra

note 91.
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prosecutions.125 Shortly after September 11th, Attorney General John
Ashcroft offered visas and the potential reward of legalization as an
inducement to noncitizens to come forward with information
concerning terrorism. It is not apparent if anyone accepted this
proffer.126 The danger for noncitizens in relying upon the hope that
they will gain lawful immigration status is made apparent not only
through the example of the Confession Program, but also in a recent
case where prosecutors chose to issue only three visas to fourteen
undocumented immigrants who offered to provide testimony in the
trial of Zacarias Moussaoui in the hope that they would receive legal
status. The other eleven were left in fear of deportation.127 Bill Hing
has made the explicit linkage between the Confession Program and
the Bush guest-worker proposal, writing that in both cases,
communities have mistakenly conceptualized the programs as
providing amnesty, when, in reality, what was offered in exchange for
identifying oneself to the government was the risk of deportation.128
Immigration tells us who belongs. On the winning side are the
terms legal and citizen; on the losing side are the terms alien and
illegal. Impossible Subjects shows us that legal categorization can shift,
that belonging is not just a matter of legal categorization, and that
perceptions of who belongs - and who does not - will shape legal
categorization. In that sense, we need to always consider three layers
of analysis: the legal category at issue; the identity of who is occupying
that legal category; and the relationship between the production of
that legal category and identity.
CONCLUSION

Ngai asserts that the task of her book is not to resolve the
foundational problem of the relationship between sovereignty,
citizenship, and immigration. But if we cannot detach sovereignty

125. S visas can be granted for critical reliable information essential to the success of an
authorized criminal investigation or prosecution and can be converted after three years into
a green card. 8 U . S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(S) (2000); 22 C.F.R. § 41.83 (2002). For a discussion of
the granting of S visas to exploited workers who provided testimony against those who
trafficked them, see Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N .C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 507 (2002).
126. Neil A. Lewis. The Informants: Immigrants
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at B7.

Offered Incentives to Give Evidence on

Terrorists,

127. Nina Bernstein, A Visa Case With a Twist: 9111 Illegal Immigrants Testified to Try to
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16. 2004, at B2. The immigrants in this case sought a U visa,
for which the S visa provided a precursor, and were planning to testify about their
bereavement or trauma in the death penalty phase of Moussaoui's case. Id.
Stay in U.S. ,

128. Bill Ong Hing, Legal Status: Amnesty or Immigration Trap ? CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9,
2004, at 17. In the case of the Confession Program, only a small minority of those who
confessed were actually deported. Ngai at 221.
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from immigration all together,129 we might, she writes, "detach
sovereignty and its master, the nation-state, from their claims of
transcendence and . . . critique them as products of history." (p. 12).
Thus, we can see that the sovereign right to determine membership
need not be unconditional (p. 12).
There is one story in the book that suggests such an alternative, set
in the context of discussions about the reform of the national origins
quotas. The Reverend Paul Empie of the National Lutheran Council,
in a speech delivered to the American Immigration Conference in
1959, argued for a vision of American national interest on the terrain
of "international understanding, well-being, and peace" (p. 253).
Empie asserted that the conventional view of restricting immigration
as an exercise of national sovereignty was not based in an appeal to
reason or morality, but was justified through national power and state
violence. Rather, he suggested, we think about "the interlocking and
mutual interests of all nations with regard to the immigration of
peoples, the interaction of culture, and the respect of universal human
rights" (p. 253). Empie's position was not an uninstrumental one. He
was concerned about the United States' position in a world
characterized by extreme disparities in wealth and power, and he was
not seeking to eliminate all controls on immigration. But he did
suggest that we disaggregate our immigration policy from a nationally
defined interest that separated the interests of the United States from
the interests of the rest of the globe.
Empie's prescription would require us to make two epistemic
leaps. First, our present-day narrative of America as a nation of
immigrants is founded on the presumption of a liberal America,
created by individual acts of uncoerced consent.130 But American
immigration history is better understood as shaped by conquest,
colonialism, and Cold War politics.131 Foregrounding this narrative
would require that we abandon our amnesia about policies creating
illegal aliens and alien citizens, forgettings that have been constituent
to our national identity.132 Second, while recognizing the central role of

129. For an articulation of the arguments in favor of detaching sovereignty from
immigration, see Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003).
130. P. 5 (quoting BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 75 (2001)
(describing the role immigrants play in supporting the narrative of liberalism's "fictive
foundation in individual acts of uncoerced consent")).
131. See Ngai's discussion of the imported colonialism of Filipino laborers, pp. 94-126,
the conquest of Mexico and subsequent importation of racialized Mexican labor, pp. 127-66,
and the Chinese Confession Program during the Cold War, pp. 202-24.
132. This might also mean that we reconceptualize the origin story of sovereign nations
as founded not through social contract, but through force. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO
S ACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998) (arguing
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force in historically shaping American immigration policy, we might
reject the association between sovereignty and the unlimited ability of
the sovereign to determine its membership (p. 12). Ngai asks that we
learn from her archive that how the sovereign has shaped membership
has shifted over time, and thus, is again in our own time, alterable (p.
12). She asks that we be honest about our past, but that we also think
boldly about our future.
May Impossible Subjects indeed lead to bold changes. Ngai creates
that possibility, through altering our vision of immigration history, in
showing us the constructed and contingent nature of its legal
regulation. Impossible Subjects is essential reading. We are the
beneficiaries of this luminous book, which, in bringing to our attention
an archive and an analysis that has heretofore escaped us, brushes
history against the grain.133

that rather than see sovereignty as rooted in the social contract we should see its origins in
banishment, exclusion, and the management of "bare life").
133. In the words of Walter Benjamin:
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.
And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in
which it was transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist therefore
dissociates himself from this process of transmission as far as possible. He regards it as his
task to brush history against the grain.
Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, in 4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED
WRffiNGS, 1 938-1940, at 392 (Michael W. Jennings, ed. 2003).

